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what role for uN PeacekeePers?
by Philippe Le Billon*
InTroducTIon
Curtailing belligerents’ access to weapons has been a major focus of international security actors.1 Although weapons embargoes and disarmament initiatives remain 
important, they are difficult to implement and generally insuffi-
cient to secure long-term peace.2 Curtailing belligerents’ access 
to revenues from high-value natural resources—such as timber, 
minerals, and opium—provides a complementary approach to 
attain security, particularly when combined with resource man-
agement reforms.3 
This paper focuses on the methods that United Nations 
(“UN”) peacekeepers employ and their capacity to help curtail 
belligerents’ access to resource revenues.4 The first part of this 
paper reviews the principal instruments used by the UNSC to 
address “conflict resources.”5 The second part examines the 
specific use of peacekeeping forces to secure resource produc-
tion areas and prevent the trafficking of conflict resources. Issues 
associated with the deployment of peacekeepers in efforts to 
curtail access to conflict resources are also discussed. 
un InITIaTIves
UN initiatives to address the links between high-value 
natural resources and armed conflicts have included commodity 
sanctions, expert panels, and specific measures undertaken6 as 
part of the peacemaking, peacekeeping, or peacebuilding tasks.7 
Among these methods, the main approach taken by the United 
Nations Security Council (“UNSC” or “Security Council”) to 
curtail belligerents’ access to resource revenues has been eco-
nomic sanctions.8 Commodity sanctions target rebel groups by 
curtailing their access to resources in order to “bankrupt” peace 
spoilers.9 Examples include the Khmer Rouge’s access to logs 
in Cambodia;10 the National Union for the Total Independence 
of Angola’s (“União Nacional para a Independência Total de 
Angola” or “UNITA”) access to diamonds;11 the Revolutionary 
United Front (“RUF”) access to diamonds in Sierra Leone;12 
the Taliban’s access to opium production in Afghanistan;13 and 
the New Forces’ (“Forces Nouvelles”) access to diamonds in 
Côte d’Ivoire.14 Resource-focused sanctions have also targeted 
the governments of Iraq15 and Liberia,16 for their training and 
funding of insurgent groups in civil wars, and Libya,17 for its 
involvement in the Lockerbie bombing.18 
With the exceptions of Cambodia, Iraq, and Libya, all 
these sanction regimes were associated with investigations by 
UN expert panels—consultants hired by the UN Secretariat to 
investigate war economies and “sanction-busting,” or “trading 
with a country with which trade has been forbidden.”19 Because 
the panels’ reports are made public, they have been instrumental 
in successful “naming and shaming” campaigns.20 Even though 
less than a handful of sanction busters were successfully pros-
ecuted by 2006, the public reports nonetheless had the desired 
chilling effect.21 
Although the UNSC holds the greatest potential and has so 
far carried the most weight in efforts to address linkages between 
high-value resources and armed conflicts, UN transitional 
authorities and specialized UN agencies have also engaged in 
activities related to managing conflict resources, by deploying 
border monitors and troops, deploying UN troops as backup 
for resource management officials, and providing supervision 
and technical assistance for economic reforms and resource 
management.22 Furthermore, these UN entities have partnered 
with national authorities and international aid agencies to reform 
resource sectors and build local institutional capacity to peace-
fully manage resources in post-conflict settings.23 For example, 
the UN Transitional Authority in Timor-Leste renegotiated 
the maritime boundary between Timor-Leste and Australia, 
the results of which had implications for petroleum exploita-
tion.24 Additionally, the UN Mission in Liberia supported the 
Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program 
(“GEMAP”).25 An initiative led by the World Bank, GEMAP 
is a quasi-trusteeship agreement that allows direct international 
supervision of most of the financial operations of the Liberian 
government—including monitoring the administration of 
natural resources such as timber and mine products.26 Other UN 
missions have had an indirect impact on resource sectors; for 
example, effective disarmament, demobilization, and reintegra-
tion programs often lead to employment for former soldiers who 
might otherwise turn to illegal resource exploitation.27 
The UNSC decides whether to impose economic sanctions 
and dispatch UN expert panels, as well as the size and mandate 
of UN missions in conflict-affected countries.28 Since the end 
of the cold war, the UNSC has theoretically had greater free-
dom to impose sanctions and similar measures because fewer 
members of the Security Council were inclined to veto such 
steps in order to support their allies.29 However, he UNSC 
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has been somewhat slow in adopting this potential in practice. 
Meanwhile, the importance of resources to armed groups 
has grown rapidly since the late 1980s, as belligerents turned 
to natural resources to replace external political sponsorship.30 
For most of the 1990s, the UNSC made increasing use of arms 
sanctions, negotiated settlements, and regional or UN peace-
keeping missions, but rarely placed commodity sanctions.31 
Although arms sanctions may be more effective than commodity 
sanctions, and may therefore continue to be the principal sanc-
tion strategy, the two approaches can be combined to resolve 
conflicts.32
Although the UNSC began implementing commodity 
sanctions in the late 1980s, it has only done so in approximately 
one-third of the conflicts involving resources between 1989 
and 2006.33 Furthermore, most of these sanctions have been 
imposed after the late 1990s, nearly a decade after resources 
came to play a major role in belligerents’ finances.34 When the 
use of commodity sanctions finally increased, it was given a fur-
ther boost by a more proactive use of sanction committees and 
expert panels.35 Because of broader engagement on the part of 
nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”), conflict analysts, and 
resource industries, sanctions are now better targeted, monitored, 
and enforced, and their humanitarian impact is more carefully 
considered.36 The UNSC has even recently bolstered the author-
ity and capacity of UN peacekeeping missions to more directly 
intervene in the control of resource sectors, most notably in the 
case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (“DRC”).37
un PeacekeePIng mIssIons  
and conFlIcT resources
UN peacekeeping operations have been established in at 
least eight countries where conflict resources contributed to 
prolonging hostilities. This section briefly reviews the mandates, 
specific measures, and effectiveness in each case building on the 
three main cases: Sierra Leone, Liberia and the DRC.
sierra leoNe
Despite UN hesitation, the UN Assistance Mission in Sierra 
Leone (“UNAMSIL”) used peacekeeping forces to regulate the 
diamond sector during the last stages of its 1999-2005 opera-
tion.38 Before that point, peacekeeping forces had intervened in 
an ad hoc fashion to prevent the escalation of resource-related 
conflicts.39 This ad hoc intervention was based on UNAMSIL’s 
fear of overstepping its mandate,40 antagonizing local interest 
groups, exposing UN troops to criminal violence, and reinforc-
ing rumors that peacekeeping forces were involved in diamond 
deals.41 Although some of these concerns were legitimate, 
reports from military observers about diamond-related armed 
conflicts, as well as requests for assistance from the govern-
ment and from the donors who were funding diamond reforms, 
eventually led UNAMSIL to take on a more proactive role.42 In 
2003, two years after hostilities had ceased, UNAMSIL began 
conducting aerial surveys, deploying foot patrols, and engaging 
in targeted conflict-settlement interventions in the diamond sec-
tor.43 Most notably, UNAMSIL also worked to prevent clashes 
between local youths with former RUF soldiers.44 These efforts 
were often undertaken jointly with the Sierra Leone Ministry of 
Mines, where UNAMSIL occasionally served in a supervisory 
capacity for the ministry.45
liBeria
The ongoing UN Mission in Liberia (“UNMIL”), estab-
lished in 2003, has illustrated potential complications of using 
peacekeeping methods to address conflict resources. UNMIL’s 
mandate is “to assist the transitional government in restoring 
proper administration of natural resources” as part of the imple-
mentation of the peace process.46 Conflict resources—mostly 
timber, but also rubber and diamonds—had played a major role 
in the Liberian conflicts between 1989 and 2003.47 
Because of the rapid cessation of hostilities and improving 
security after 2003, UNMIL did not confront extensive problems 
with conflict commodities.48 This was a positive factor consid-
ering that UNMIL’s full deployment took nine months, largely 
because UN member countries failed to provide the pledged 
troops.49 Nevertheless, UNMIL was subject to criticism for fail-
ing to do more to address the problem of conflict resources.50 
Among its critics was Global Witness, the leading NGO in 
the realm of resources and armed conflicts.51 In 2005, Global 
Witness wrote a letter to the UNSC, stating that UNMIL had 
failed to implement its mandate because 
they have not been given the legal authority to act  
as independently and proactively as they need to 
effectively seek out and stop illegal timber or diamond 
operations. . . . UNMIL’s ability to fulfill its mandate 
is further undermined by its lack of deployment  
in diamond and timber-rich areas, particularly along 
Liberia’s porous border regions with Côte d’Ivoire, 
Guinea and Sierra Leone.52
While UNMIL did not undertake sufficient efforts to secure 
conflict commodities, it did create an environment and natural 
resources unit that worked with local and international organiza-
tions on protecting Liberia’s natural resources53 Arguably, other 
UN agencies—such as the UN Environment Programme, the 
Food and Agriculture Organization, and the UN Development 
Programme—have a more general mandate to engage in envi-
ronmental protection and resource management, but the creation 
of the environment and natural resources unit was in line with 
UNMIL’s quasi-trusteeship functions during the transition period 
from 2003 to 2005.54
UNMIL did carry out some aerial reconnaissance to monitor 
mining, along with occasional, but rare, ground patrols.55 On 
some occasions, UNMIL also deployed troops in resource-rich 
areas—for example, to remove artisanal diamond miners oper-
ating illegally within an oil palm plantation;56 to close a large 
artisanal diamond mining site that had been identified by an 
expert panel but had not been shut down by the transitional gov-
ernment—allegedly, diamonds were being stockpiled at the site 
while the owners waited for sanctions to be lifted;57 and to pro-
tect the interests of a U.S. diamond company and “restore calm 
and order” after demonstrations at a Firestone rubber concession 
in 2007.58 Some troop deployments have sparked controversy. 
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In particular, Liberian mining interests and company employ-
ees have accused UNMIL of protecting the interests of foreign 
companies over those of local populations.59 Such accusations 
demonstrate that UN peacekeeping activities in resource sectors 
can generate new conflicts, and should therefore be considered 
from a political perspective instead of being narrowly conceived 
as a law-and-order measure.
democratic rePuBlic of the coNgo (“drc”)
The UNSC has implemented an array of peacekeeping 
tools to address conflict resources during the UN mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (“Mission de l’Organisation 
des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo,” or 
“MONUC”). Mineral resources have historically financed both 
local and foreign-armed groups especially in the eastern part of 
the country during the first civil war between 1996 to 1997, the 
second war from 1998 to 2003, as well as during the aftermath of 
the second war.60 Although the UN has used expert panel inves-
tigations and public reporting to address this issue, it did not 
impose sanctions on conflict resources in the DRC until 2008.61
In December 2008, through Resolution 1856, the Security 
Council gave MONUC a mandate to “coordinate operations with 
the [Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(“FARDC”) to prevent] the provision of support to illegal armed 
groups, including support derived from illicit economic activi-
ties.”62 Resolution 1856 also gave MONUC the authority to “use 
its monitoring and inspection capacities to curtail the provision 
of support to illegal armed groups derived from illicit trade in 
natural resources.”63 In Resolution 1857, the UNSC extended 
the list of individuals and companies subject to travel sanctions, 
financial sanctions, or both, to “individuals or entities supporting 
the illegal armed groups in the eastern part of the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo through illicit trade of natural resources,” 
sending a strong signal to companies involved in trading conflict 
resources.64 Despite its broad authority, however, MONUC faced 
challenges implementing Resolution 1856. These challenges 
included the fact that MONUC troops’ lacked autonomous 
authority to intervene without the FARDC, and accusations of 
human rights abuses and resource trafficking by the FARDC.65
Table 1. Control of Conflict Resources by UN Peacekeeping Missions, 1988–200992 







Policy coordination and technical cooperation; no military component.
Angola: UNAVEMa (1988–1997); 
MONUAb (1997–1999)
Observation. Ban on  
noncertified diamond exports
The mission had very limited effectiveness, but the ban was effective—partly 
because of military pressure on UNITA from the Angolan government, and 
partly because the governments in Kinshasa and Brazzaville, which had pro-
vided conduits for UNITA’s diamond smuggling, were toppled; peacekeepers 
provided some assistance to UN expert panels.
Cambodia: UNTACc (1992–
1993)
Transitional authority. Ban on 
logging exports (sawn timber 
exempt)
Limited effectiveness because the ban was not implemented for long enough, 
and there was no UN enforcement of the ban in Khmer Rouge areas along the 
Thai border; the UN mission provided some assistance as a transitional author-
ity in the area of environmental and resource management.
Côte d’Ivoire: MINUCIj (2003–
2004), UNOCIk (2004–present)
Assistance. Ban on all  
diamond exports
Embargo-monitoring unit; no mandate to address key resource sectors (e.g., 
cocoa) from which rebels obtain financing.
Croatia: UNTAESd (1996–1998) Transitional authority.  
Border monitoring
Limited support for local police forces.
DRC: MONUCf (1999–2010), 
MONUSCOg (2010-present)
Assistance. Curtailing  
financing of illegal groups
Monitoring, border control at airports, some military assistance to Congolese 
army to curtail armed groups’ access to natural resources.
Liberia: UNMILi (2003–present) Assistance. Ban on timber and 
all diamond exports
Limited assistance in key areas; UNMIL also maintains an  
Environment and Natural Resources Unit, which assists UN expert panels.
Sierra Leone: UNAMSILe 
(1999–2005)
Assistance. Ban on noncertified 
diamond exports
Peacekeepers provided some assistance with monitoring and conflict resolu-
tion in the diamond sector.
Notes:
a. UN Angola Verification Missions; b. UN Observer Mission in Angola; c. UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia; d. UN Transitional Administra-
tion in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium; e. UN Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone; f. UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo); g. UN Stabilization Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en République Démocratique du Congo); h. UN Assistance 
Mission in Afghanistan; i. UN Mission in Liberia ; j. UN Mission in Côte d’Ivoire ; k. UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire.
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dIscussIon
As an international military force deployed to “keep the 
peace,” UN peacekeeping operations—and, more broadly, 
non-UN peacekeeping forces, such as regional peacekeeping 
forces—have a unique ability to help sever links between resources 
and peace spoilers. Although peacekeepers could theoretically be 
deployed to control diamond mining, logging, or drug trafficking 
operations that finance armed groups, the governments that are 
mandating peacekeeping operations—through the UNSC, for 
example—are often reluctant to assign peacekeepers such roles.66
When deciding whether to deploy UN troops for combat 
operations intended to curtail rebel access to resources a number 
of considerations must be addressed, including the direct inter-
vention’s legality, the intervention’s affect on relations between 
the UN mission, the host government, and local populations, and 
the peacekeeping missions capacity to intervene successfully. 67
Legally, local authorities have the right to prohibit unilat-
eral UN troop deployment, unless the country is under a UN 
trusteeship mandate whereby sovereign authority is vested in a 
UN administrative body.68 Moreover, because many missions 
are carried out under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, which 
addresses pacific settlement of disputes, rather than Chapter 
VII, which addresses forceful settlement of disputes, peacekeep-
ing missions are prevented from engaging in any “offensive” 
combat role, such as taking control of resource production 
areas.69 Out of the half-dozen peacekeeping missions estab-
lished since 1989 in response to commodity-financed conflicts, 
only one—MONUC—has been specifically mandated to address 
the financing of illegal groups by illicit economic activities.70 
That lone example included military support to DRC govern-
ment troops.71 In recent years, the UN Head of Mission and the 
UN Mission Chief of Staff, as well as individual UN-mandated 
military contingents have used their “room for maneuver” 
to investigate, report on, or stop illegal resource trade and 
management practices.72 Despite this trend, decision makers 
within UN missions have generally been wary of overstepping 
their mandate, overextending or diverting resources, alienating 
economic or political stakeholders, or putting both peacekeepers 
and civilians at risk by interfering with the economic interests of 
criminals and armed groups.73 
Sovereignty issues, including sovereignty over resources, 
have also discouraged those governments sending and receiving 
resources from assigning UN peacekeepers an active role in 
preventing conflict resources from funding peace spoilers.74 The 
economic interests of governments and companies may conflict 
either because a company and a host government are competing 
producers, or because a sending government also happens to be 
the home government of investors.75 Therefore, if peacekeepers 
are directly involved in conflict resources issue, there may be 
allegations that the peacekeepers are serving the interests of 
their home countries—specifically by protecting those countries’ 
access to resources.76 Although the U.S. invasion of Iraq was not 
a “peacekeeping” mission, the non-UN mandated and U.S.-led 
“coalition of the willing” was the subject of such allegations.77 
On the other hand, shared economic interests could create an 
incentive for granting peacekeeping missions broader mandates 
and thereby increasing their effectiveness.
Military capacity must also be considered when deciding 
whether to deploy UN troops to protect resources from peace 
spoilers. Most governments provide troops to UN missions on the 
assumption that the risk of casualties is very low.78 In addition, 
the military capacity of most UN contingents is usually limited, 
especially for offensive combat operations.79 Many governments 
that send troops to UN peacekeeping missions view resource 
control not only as a high-risk option, but as a distraction from 
or counterproductive to peacekeepers’ principal political and 
humanitarian mandates.80 “Robust” peacekeeping—entailing 
combat operations in mining or logging areas, for example—is 
thus unlikely, in part because of the risk of casualties among 
both civilians and UN troops.81 Nevertheless, in some cases, the 
deployment of UN troops in resource areas has been viewed as a 
necessity.82 Where such efforts have been undertaken, however, 
they have occasionally met with determined resistance from 
armed groups, and the resource-rich areas have often been the 
last ones to come under UN control.83 
At the mission level, operational staffs, both at headquar-
ters and on the ground, recognize the importance of curtailing 
peace spoilers’ access to high-value resources, but they are also 
aware of the difficulties associated with intervention. Mission 
staff often report on the role of resources in local skirmishes, 
not only between armed groups, but also between rival govern-
ment security agencies, private militias, and criminal gangs.84 
This low-level violence rarely receives political attention, 
but political affairs officers in UN missions have nevertheless 
warned of the potential for escalation.85 They have also noted the 
broader implications of resource revenues for relations within 
and between armed groups.86 Such issues have also received 
greater consideration because UN intelligence efforts have been 
boosted by Joint Mission Analysis Cells, which are charged 
with assessing the overall political and security situations of UN 
missions and reporting to the Special Representatives of the UN 
Secretary General that head the missions.87
After addressing these considerations, the UN intervention 
would proceed if it will likely make a substantial contribution to 
a speedier end to the conflict, without creating harmful conse-
quences in the future, for example loss of livelihood or abuse by 
rebel groups. When armed groups’ access to conflict resources 
is curtailed, they sometimes turn on the local populations, either 
to obtain funding or simply for revenge—events for which the 
UN would bear some responsibility.88 Furthermore, analysis 
reveals that rebel groups operating in resource-rich environ-
ments tend to commit worse abuses against civilians.89 This 
behavior appears to be associated with a membership pool of 
“consumers” rather than “investors”—that is, combatants who 
are drawn to the rebellion by short-term, opportunistic economic 
objectives rather than by long-term political objectives.90 In the 
short term, UN military interventions in resource sectors may 
risk exacerbating abuses by rebels against civilian populations. 
But in the long term, such interventions may not only reduce the 
funding and operating capacity of rebel groups, but may also 
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help focus rebel movements on political objectives, and there-
fore on negotiations, rather than on survival and profiteering.91
conclusIon
Peacekeeping forces can play a role in curtailing peace 
spoilers’ access to resource revenues. Yet, the evidence reviewed 
for this paper suggests that peacekeeping missions have so 
far gained limited direct experience in seeking to achieve this 
goal. Such interventions must be carefully considered from 
legal, humanitarian, political and economic standpoints before 
being carried out, preceded by careful operational planning, and 
conducted by adequately trained, equipped, and disciplined 
international forces so that the risks of human rights abuses, 
military failure and corruption are minimized. Additionally, any 
collaboration between peacekeepers with local forces should be 
come under stringent guidelines and monitoring. Short of engag-
ing in interdiction, peacekeepers do have the potential to help 
collect information on resource sectors, remove peace spoilers 
from important resource extraction areas, and back up police 
efforts to arrest illicit traders.
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